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NOTES AND COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MUNICIPAL MARKETING BARRIERS-"STICKER"
ORDINANCES
Bill by a large mail-order house and a direct plumbing supply
company to enjoin enforcement of a so-called "sticker" ordinance.1
Under the ordinance, affixation of stickers, marked for "resale" or
"installation," was required on all plumbing fixtures sold, the appli-
cation for stickers to show applicant's right to sell or install such
fixtures. A further provision required a weekly report by the seller
of all fixtures sold, the report to carry names and addresses of pur-
chasers and sticker serial numbers. Upon the authority of a pre-
vious decision2 involving a similar, but earlier, Dayton ordinance, the
Court of Appeals, reversing the trial court ruling, granted a perma-
nent injunction. On appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court, held, three
judges dissenting, affirmed; the ordinance constituted an unwar-
ranted interference with private rights, beyond the necessities of the
situation. Direct Plumbing Supply Co. v. City of Dayton, 138 Ohio
St. 540, 38 N. E. (2d) 70 (i941).
Although commonplace, the assertion bears repeating that the
United States has been witnessing a revolution in marketing com-
parable, in resulting dislocation of established business mores, to the
earlier transition from small-scale to mass production. Manifesta-
tions are numerous; witness, for instance, the challenge of such com-
petitive products as oleomargarine for butter, natural gas and fuel
oil for coal, industrial alcohol for petroleum gasoline,3 and the at-
tempted integration of unrelated lines by the meat packers and the
small automobile retailers in response to the impact of overhead cost
I Dayton Ordinance No. 15052, reproduced in the concurring opinion of Matthias, J.,
in the principal case.
2 City of Dayton v. Bohochek, 26 Ohio L. Abs. 417 (Ohio App. 1938), appeal dis-
milssed, Ohio Sup. Ct. 'Iay 4, 1938. Hound City Plumbing Supply Co. v. Dickman, an
unreported 'Xissouri decision, had also invalidated the "sticker"-type ordinance.
3See, e. g., the testimony on the oleomargarine-butter conflict in 29 T. N. E. C.
HrAmNtGS, (1940) 15823-15866.
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upon the marketing structure.4  Conflicts between new and the more
orthodox channels of distribution constitute another phase of the
marketing revolution. Most colorful has been the struggle between
independent and chain; but equally intense has been the economic
rivalry born of inroads by the mail-order house and the direct-supply
company upon the established hierarchy of wholesaler-jobber-retailer.
Thus in the marketing area involved in the principal litigation, an
apparently authoritative estimate places at 25 percent the amount of
plumbing, heating and roofing business now done 'by the two types
of concerns, while indicating that failure has attended efforts to meet
their growing challenge by pledging master plumbers and heating
contractors to a code of honor forbidding installation of fixtures so
marketed.' Failures such as this in the economic arena of self-help
have, along with other factors, stimulated a resort to legislative halls
that has placed on the statute books of federal, state and municipal
governments a vast amount of marketing barrier legislation.6 Anti-
chain statutes of varying types testify to the vigor of the effort legis-
latively to place hazards, if not complete barriers, in the path of chain
access to the market; the sticker ordinance represents a comparable
attempt by law to stay the economic hand of the direct-seller of major
plumbing supplies. Enacted ostensibly to curb the sale of second-hand,
"insanitary" fixtures, such ordinances serve very nicely as competitive
impedimenta; their requirements are little more than a minor irrita-
tion to the local trade, yet represent a major harassment to sales
operations by mail-order and direct-supply companies.
Judicial reaction to the inevitable appeal to constitutional guar-
anty may take two general forms. Acceptance of the legislation for
what it purports to be, refusal to inquire into ulterior legislative
motive, and emphasis upon current conceptions of the weight to be
accorded the presumption of constitutionality produce judgments
finding in barrier legislation a not unreasonable relation to the public
health, safety or morals. Thus billboard regulation has been vali-
dated in the name of public morals,7 prohibition of street vending of
4See Comment (1932) 42 YxE L. J. 81, on the former; note (1939) 5 Ozio ST.
L. J. 377, on the latter.
(March, 1940) 21 FORTUNE 57-62, 158.
6A survey and economic analysis of such legislation is to be found in the symposium
on Govern nental Marketing Barriers (1941) 8 LAw & CONTEM. PROBS. 234-409.
'Thomas Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U. S. 526 (1909). More recently,
however, billboard regulation has been judicially examined on the basis of its true,
esthetic purpose. See, Gardiner, The Massachusetts Billboard Decision (1936) 49 HARv.
L. Rnv. 869.
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ice cream products as a safety measure, 8 and limited hours for bar-
ber shops by invocation of both these attributes of police powerY
Contemporary law review comment would decide, as though it were
a public health problem, the issue of legislative intervention in the
competitive struggle between paper and glass for the right to carry
the nation's retail milk supply.' Similar satisfaction with a rule-of-
thumb of objective constitutionality would, in the instant litigation,
halt judicial scrutiny at the ordinance's declaration, by way of pre-
amble, that the municipal purpose was to promote sanitation and
discourage thievery. In vivid contrast is judicial treatment of the
challenged legislation for what it is-governmental favoritism in an
economic struggle of institutional life and death. Such judicial real-
ism does not necessarily mean the invalidation of statutes which
by the other view would escape unscathed; much of this legislative
bulk can pass muster before today's economic thinking,"' and even
when it cannot it is not for the courts to sit in judgment provided it
possesses some tolerable basis. But judicial repudiation of its own
otrichification would force analysis of governmental intervention
in terms of the true issue of its relationship to, or lack of rational
connection with, the general welfare, with, it may be argued, a con-
sequent improvement of the courts' record in the matter. 1 2 While in
decision the present action of the Ohio Supreme Court is in line with
adverse judgment on barrier legislation in several other prototype
cases," it scarcely proves complete conversion 14 to the realistic
judicial approach there apparent. Rather, the principal case falls in
an in-between category of court attitude which on appropriate factual
occasion will turn against itself the superficial legislative claim of con-
cern for public health, safety or morals; it was the prior existence of
seemingly adequate health and crime controls that led this court to
denounce the sticker ordinance as unwarranted interference with
private rights beyond the necessities of the situation. How it would
react to a fact pattern in which such a contradiction was not so
clearly apparent remains a matter of conjecture. J. C. B.
8 X-eel Dairy v. City of Akron, 63 Ohio App. 147, 25 N. E. (2d) 700 (1939).
2Wilson v. City of Zanesville, 130 Ohio St. 286, 199 N. F_. 187 (1936); Feldman v.
City of Cincinnati, 20 F. Supp. 531 (S. D. Ohio 1937).
11 Note (1942) 26 ILL. L. REv. 578, annotating Fieldcrest Dairies v. City of Chicago,
122 F. (2d) 132 (C. C. A. 7th 1941), ccrt. granted, 62 S. Ct. 301 (1941.)
55 Sce the economic analyses in the symposium on Governmental Marketing Barriers,
supra, note 6, especially that of Wolff, Monopolistic Competitions in Distribution, id. at 303.
1 Isaacs, Barricr Activities and the Courts: A Study in Anti-Comlpetitive Law (1941)
8 LAw & Cor;T.mp. Pr.oBs. 382. But cf, note (1939) 5 OHIO ST. L. J. 377 at 382.
" Good Humor Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 382 (1940); New Jer-
sey Good Humor, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs., 124 N. J. L. 162, 11 AtI. (2d) 113 (1940).
14 Compare the court's handling of Wilson v. City of Zanesville, supra, note 9.
